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Abstract—During the last decade, a new class of large-
scale globally-distributed network services and applications have
emerged. Those systems are flexible in the sense that they
can select their communication path among a set of available
ones. However, ceaselessly gathering network information such
as latency to select a path is infeasible due to the large amount of
measurement traffic it would generate. To overcome this issue,
Network Coordinates Systems (NCS) have been proposed. An
NCS allows hosts to predict latencies without performing direct
measurements and, consequently, reduce the network resources
consumption. During these last years, NCS opened new research
fields in which the networking community has produced an
impressive amount of work. We believe it is now time to stop and
take stock of what has been achieved so far. In this paper, we
survey the various NCS proposed as well as their intrinsic limits.
In particular, we focus on security issues and solutions proposed
to fix them. We also discuss potential future NCS developments,
in particular how to use NCS for predicting bandwidth.
I. INTRODUCTION
As innovative ways are being developed to harvest the
enormous potential of Internet infrastructure, a new class of
large-scale globally-distributed network services and applica-
tions such as distributed overlay network multicast [1], [2],
content addressable overlay networks [3], [4], and peer-to-
peer file sharing such as Gnutella [5], OceanStore [6], BitTor-
rent [7], [8], etc. have emerged. To achieve network topology-
awareness, most, if not all, of these overlays rely on the notion
of proximity, usually defined in terms of network delays or
round-trip times (RTTs), for optimal neighbor selection during
overlay construction and maintenance.
Because these systems have a lot of flexibility in choosing
their communication paths, they can greatly benefit from
intelligent path selection based on network performance. Col-
lecting up-to-date performance measurements between nodes
in an overlay network would be very beneficial for those
applications. Especially, in a wide-area network, communi-
cation performances have a significant impact on the overall
execution time of operations.
For instance, in a peer-to-peer file sharing application, a
client ideally wants to know the available bandwidth between
itself and all the peers that have the desired file. Proximity-
aware distributed hash tables would use latency measurements
to reduce the delay stretch of lookups [9]. Content distribution
systems would construct network-aware trees to minimize dis-
semination times [10]. Decentralized web caches need latency
information to map clients to cache locations, or to guide the
selection of a download server from multiple replicas. And
finally, a topology knowledge would allow the construction of
efficient multicast delivery trees.
Nevertheless, path performance measurements require to
inject probes in the network, burdening so the network and
leading to an inadmissible measurement cost: one measure-
ment per pair of nodes and the number of pairs is a quadratic
function of the number of nodes. For example, re-directing
clients to the nearest data centers would require Google to
maintain latency from virtually every Web client in the Internet
to each of its data centers [11]. Moreover, obtaining the
information can exceed the cost of the effective process [12],
[13], [14]. In other words, performance measurement is not
scalable.
It is important for the new applications presented above to
limit the resources consumption and particularly the number
of on-demand measurements. In such a context, Network Co-
ordinates Systems (NCS) have been proposed to allow hosts to
estimate delays without performing direct measurements and
thus, reduce the consumption of network resources. The key
idea of an NCS is to model the Internet as a geometric space
and characterize the position of any node in the Internet by a
position (i.e., a coordinate) in this space. The network distance
between any two nodes is then predicted as the geometric
distance between their coordinates. Explicit measurements are,
therefore, not anymore required.
Content distribution and file sharing systems can benefit
from network coordinates in order to select a number of
replicated servers to fetch data from. Azureus [15] (now called
Vuze), for instance, was the first large-scale real world appli-
cation to use a coordinates system. In addition to choosing the
closest replicated server, reducing the overall length of client to
server network paths allow one to localize the communication,
leading to lower backbone and inter-ISP link utilization. Sim-
ilar benefits can be achieved for other large scale distributed
applications such as peer-to-peer overlays or online gaming
platforms. OASIS [16], a distributed anycast system, is shared
across several application services and makes use of network
coordinates to amortize deployment and network measurement
costs.
This paper, in which we review the different coordinates-
based embedding techniques that have been featured in liter-
ature so far, is intended to be a single point of reference for
researchers interested in NCS.
In this paper, we begin by describing a few proposed works
2that do provide network proximity or location estimates, but
do not rely on “virtual” coordinates embedded into geometric
spaces (Sec. II). Such an introduction is intended to underline
the inconvenient usage of a so-called “direct measurement
systems” and hence to present the benefits of NCS usage
(Sec. III). Then, we concentrate on describing network co-
ordinates systems that fit within the class of landmark-based
approaches or more generally centralized systems (Sec. IV-
A). We present different distributed coordinates-based systems
for network positioning (Sec. IV-B). We also discuss the
limitations inherent to NCS and explain how they might be
overtaken (Sec. V) and focus in particular on security issues
(Sec. VI). We then present potential future directions for
NCS, in particular how they can be used to predict bandwidth
(Sec. VII). We finally conclude this paper by reminding its
main contributions (Sec. VIII).
II. LOCALIZATION TECHNIQUES
Several approaches in the literature provide network prox-
imity or location estimates using either direct pair-wise mea-
surements, or by supplying directly applications with net-
work distances estimates. In contrast to network coordinates
systems, these approaches do not attempt to globally model
Internet hosts positions using absolute coordinates, but rather,
most of them try to contribute in specific application needs,
such as special peer lookups, clustering, etc. In the following,
we underline the most known approaches that have been
proposed for locating network nodes. In Sec. II-A, we focus
on the Global Positioning System, a positioning system based
on satellites. Sec. II-B addresses geolocation techniques, i.e.,
determining the physical location of an Internet host . Finally,
Sec. II-C describes Meridian, a framework for finding nearest
peers in overlay networks.
A. Global Positioning System
The Global Positioning System (GPS) [17] is a positioning
system based on satellites. Basically, the GPS performs the
localization through the computation of the distance separating
a GPS receiver and several satellites.
The receiver uses the arrival time of each message to mea-
sure the distance to each satellite, from which it determines
the position of the receiver (conceptually the intersection of
spheres). The resulting coordinates are converted to more user-
friendly forms such as latitude and longitude, or location on
a map, then displayed to the user.
Since the space has three dimensions, one might think that
using three satellites would be enough to calculate the position
of a receiver. However, this would require the time to be very
accurate (i.e., on a nanosecond scale), which is very difficult
to achieve outside a laboratory. Using four or more satellites
allows one to get rid of this clock accuracy need.
B. Geolocation approaches
Many works have been proposed for inferring the geograph-
ical location of network nodes, rather than the Internet posi-
tions (e.g., in a latency space). Geolocation approaches [18]
are intended to provide where the host is in the real world,
whereas the network coordinates systems intend to provide
relative positions between host in terms of network distances
(e.g., latency). In other words, for geolocating hosts, distances
refer to actual geographic distances between hosts. In contrast,
distance in the context of network coordinates systems refers
to the network delay between a pair of Internet hosts.
Throughout the years, several techniques have been pro-
posed for locating Internet hosts. They can be roughly clas-












g3τ g3τ + γ3τ
Fig. 1. Multilateration with geographic distance constraints
Database techniques, such as IP2LL [19], make use of
Whois data to infer geographic location information. DNS
techniques, such as GeoTrack [20], infer an host location from
names provided by the targeted host DNS or the routers close
to it. It assumes that the DNS name provides location infor-
mation at various granularity levels (city, state, or country).
Clustering techniques (see, for instance, GeoCluster [20]) are
based on the notion of cluster, i.e., a group of clients that are
topologically close and under the same administrative control.
Hosts belonging to the same cluster are said co-located. If
one knows the geographic location of a few hosts within the
cluster, one might infer the location of the whole cluster.
Finally, delay measurement techniques, such as GeoPing [20]
or Constraint-Based Geolocation (CBG) [21], try to exploit
a correlation between the delay and the geographic distance.
For instance, CBG infers the geographical location of net-
work nodes using multilateration. Multilateration refers to the
estimation of a point position using a sufficient number of
distances (geographical distances in our case) to some fixed
points whose positions are known. Geographical distances
to the landmarks are deduced from the correspondent delay
distances (obtained by direct probing between the landmarks
and the target host) by relying on the assumption that digital
information travels along fiber optic cables at almost exactly
32/3 the speed of light in a vacuum. Basically, given the
geographical locations of the landmarks and their geographical
distances to a given target host, an estimation of the location
of the target host is achieved using multilateration.
An example of multilateration is shown on Fig. 1. Plain
circles depict the actual geographical distance, while dashed
circles refer to the distance obtained when transforming the
RTT into geographical distance. There is a distance overesti-
mation, leading to the creation of confidence zone in which
the host will be found.
C. Meridian Approach
Wong et al. proposed a framework, called Meridian [22],
for hosts to lookup their nearest peers in an overlay network.
The key idea in Meridian is to construct a multi resolution
ring structure that guides requests sent through this structure
to nodes that are closer and closer to the sender. Basically, each
Meridian node keeps track of a small, fixed number of other
hosts that are organized and maintained in a ring structure
with exponentially growing ring radii. When a node sends a
query, for its nearest peer, such a query is forwarded along
the ring structure, which exponentially reduces the distance to
the target at each query hop.
In contrast to coordinates-based systems, Meridian acts as
an on-demand nearest node look-up service, and focuses more
on individual nodes requests, rather than building a global
coordinates service, that would allow for multiple distances
estimations.
The following section discusses the major challenges of
using direct measurements services.
D. Main drawbacks
The different approaches we discussed above try to solve
either distance prediction or topology-aware routing problems
with direct measurements. Although dynamic network perfor-
mance characteristics such as available bandwidth and latency
are the most relevant to applications and can be accurately
measured on demand, the huge number of wide-area-spanning
end-to-end paths that need to be considered in these distributed
systems makes performing on-demand network measurements
impractical because it is too costly and time-consuming.
Proximity measurements, based on repeated pair-wise dis-
tance measurements between nodes, can prove to be very oner-
ous in terms of measurement overheads. Indeed, the existence
of several overlays simultaneously can result in significant
bandwidth consumption by proximity measurements (i.e., ping
storms) carried out by individual overlay nodes [23]. Also,
measuring and tracking proximity within a rapidly changing
group requires high frequency measurements. We can also
consider as an example the case of the Stribling’s service [24],
collecting RTT data between the PlanetLab nodes, that ceased
its activity since the measurements overhead induced by this
service becomes unmanageable for the PlanetLab infrastruc-
ture.
As a summary, most of the systems we introduced above
are dedicated to overlay construction and lookups, rather than























(b) The virtual space
Fig. 2. Correspondence between the Internet and the virtual space
In order to predict distances between any pair of nodes in
the Internet, these non coordinate-based systems still need
to perform costly measurements. In contrast, the embedding
techniques do not require a full mesh of RTT measurements,
to predict distance between any pair of nodes in the system.
III. NETWORK COORDINATES SYSTEM BASICS
To establish a consensus between the performance opti-
mization needs introduced by the overlay networks and the
scalability constraints imposed by underlying IP networks,
several coordinates-based approaches aiming to estimate net-
work distances have been proposed. The key idea of such
systems is to model the Internet as a geometric space and
characterize the position of any node in the Internet by a
position in this space. The network distance between any two
nodes is then predicted as the geometric distance between their
coordinates without explicit measurements. In other words, if
a node x learns the coordinates of a node y, x does not have
to perform an explicit measurement to determine the distance
to y; instead, the distance between x and y in the coordinates
space is an accurate predictor of the network distance. It means
that, as long as a reasonably accurate position for a node can be
obtained with little effort, much of the distance measurement
sampling cost can be eliminated and the remaining overhead
amortized over many distance predictions.
Fig. 2 depicts the matching between the Internet and the
virtual space. On Fig. 2(a), distances between four Internet
hosts are represented. This distance can be, for instance,
the round-trip time (RTT). Fig. 2(b) presents the estimated
distances into a virtual space. Most NCS map Internet hosts
to a virtual geometric space to estimate distances. In such a
space, the estimated distance is evaluated using the classical
distance function in a geometric space.
Predicting distances through coordinates makes sense if and
only if a certain level of accuracy is guaranteed. It would be
a matter of concern if the estimated distances do not reflect
the reality. Therefore, when computing coordinates, an NCS
aims at minimizing a relative error function. Typically, such
a function will be built so that a zero value means a perfect
prediction, while a positive value indicates that the predicted




where dAB is the measured distance between nodes A and
4B and dˆAB is the predicted distance. The absolute value of the
directional relative error is called the relative error (Eqn. 2) 1.
| dAB − dˆAB |
min(dˆAB , dAB)
. (2)
Most NCS map Internet hosts to a virtual Euclidean space
to estimate distances. In such a space, the estimated distance




(~xA − ~xB)2i . (3)
where ~xA represents the coordinates vector of host A and
~xB the coordinates vector of host B coordinates.
While the relative error is a good indicator of the accuracy
of a given coordinate system, in terms of distance estimation,
in many cases, applications only need to identify the nearest
nodes among a set of candidate nodes. To answer how well a
coordinate system can identify those closest nodes to a given
one, a new metric called relative rank loss (rrl) has been
proposed in [26]. For a given source node, and a randomly
selected pair of nodes, this metric orders the actual distances
and the estimated distances of each node of the chosen pair
towards the source node. It is important that the relative
rankings of distances is not lost. The rrl at a source node
C can be computed according to the following formula:
rrl(φ,C) =





where φ is a metric space, N is the set of nodes, (A,B)
are elements of N ×N (with N being the set of nodes in the
system), and swapped (C,A,B) is true when the C’s relative
relationship to A and B is different in the two rankings, i.e.,
the original and the mapping (embedded) spaces. Note that,
the rrl takes values between 0 (for no loss of relative order)
and 1 (for a complete reversal of order). In other words, this
metric quantifies the probability of incorrect rankings.
NCS offer many advantages, among them:
• Easy and practical support to P2P applications. Since
most of current P2P applications would benefit from
nodes’ locations in the Internet, NCS seem to be of great
benefit to these applications, in particular P2P nodes can
easily maintain coordinates that would allow them to
characterize proximity among them.
• Scalability. NCS have been designed to offer scalability
properties to applications using them. In essence, coordi-
nates computed locally and shared among all nodes in the
network would allow for network distances estimations
with very low overhead. The measurement overhead
produced by each node positioning can be amortized over
many un-measured distance predictions.
• Acceptable accuracy. Even though the mapping between
actual network distances and geometric distances in the
1In some literatures, instead of min(dˆAB , dAB), dAB is used. This
usually produces smaller relative errors.
Fig. 3. Measurement overhead versus number of nodes
virtual spaces as constructed by current NCS is not
perfect, a reasonably accurate positioning of nodes can be
achieved. Network positioning errors achieved by today’s
NCS are often acceptable for a majority of applications,
that would rely on a local appreciation of proximity
between nodes, rather than on a complete knowledge of
inter-nodes actual distances.
Fig. 3 shows the measurement overhead (i.e., the amount of
probes injected in the network) as a function of the number
of nodes in the system. Without any scalable measurement
technique, the overhead is a quadratic function of the num-
ber of nodes involved in the system. In a system such as
Azureus [15], such a measurement campaign would not be
scalable. To offer the scalability property, any NCS should
have an overhead much lower than the curve presented in
Fig. 3.
Finally, note that there are two families of NCS. Landmarks-
based coordinates systems, where a fixed set of well-known
trusted nodes are used to compute coordinates for all other
nodes in the system. And, decentralized coordinates systems,
where any node might be used to compute the coordinates of
any other. In Sec. IV, we will present various NCS, some of
them being landmarks-based, others being decentralized.
IV. EXISTING NETWORK COORDINATES SYSTEM
Internet Distance Map Service (IDMaps) [12] is the first
complete system that aims at predicting Internet distance and
might be seen as the predecessor of landmark-based coordinate
systems. IDMaps is an infrastructural service in which special
HOPS servers maintain a virtual topology map of the Internet
consisting of end hosts and special hosts called Tracers. This
virtual topology map is used to predict Internet distance. For
example, the distance between hosts x and y is estimated as the
distance between x and its nearest Tracer T1, plus the distance
between y and its nearest Tracer T2, plus the shortest path
distance from T1 to T2 over the Tracer virtual topology. As the
number of Tracers grow, the prediction accuracy of IDMaps
tends to improve. Designed as a client-server architecture






































(b) Ordinary host operations
Fig. 4. Operations in a landmark-based approach
Compared to the IDMaps, coordinate-based systems are
different in that nodes are able to use their own resources
to compute their positions in the Internet. Moreover, these
systems do not directly interact with any applications. It is up
to the applications running on end hosts to decide how to use
the computed locations (coordinates).
IDMaps sets then the basis for coordinate-based approaches.
Indeed, such a service was driven by the main principle of
predicting some Internet distances from an a priori partial
knowledge of the topology rather than systematically mea-
suring it.
A. Landmark-Based Approaches
Typically, landmark-based approaches are a two part archi-
tecture made of landmarks and ordinary hosts. A landmark
refers to a well known node computing its own coordinates
while an ordinary host evaluates its coordinates based on
landmarks ones. This architecture is illustrated in Fig. 4.
In such an approach, only the landmarks need to perform
all-pairs latency measurements, as shown in Fig. 4(a), and then
map themselves into the geometric space.
An ordinary host desiring to position itself in the geometric
space first performs measurement towards the landmarks.
Next, based on those measurements and the landmarks coordi-
nates, it computes its own coordinates. This process is shown
in Fig. 4(b).
In the following, we investigate different NCS that are based
on landmarks for coordinates computation.
Global Network Positioning (GNP) [13] is the implementa-
tion of a standard landmark-based NCS, as presented above.
It is the first system to propose modeling the Internet as an
n-dimensional geometric space. Given such a space, GNP ap-
proximates the latency between pair of hosts as the Euclidean





















l1 = {n4n5} l2 = {n4n6}
n7 = c1 · l1 + c2 · l2
n7
(c) Transition
Fig. 5. Lighthouses behavior
With GNP, K landmarks are required, K being at least
n + 1 in an n-dimensional geometric space, otherwise it is
impossible to compute an host coordinates. This constraint is
explained by the uniqueness of coordinates required for every
host. In an n-dimensional space, n + 1 landmarks to achieve
a multilateration towards the target host to localize are indeed
necessary.
As already explained, GNP starts by instructing the land-
marks to measure the inter-landmark latencies. Based on these
latencies, GNP calculates all the landmark coordinates so
that the distance between any pair of these coordinates is as
close as possible to the actual measured latency between the
corresponding pair of the landmarks. The discrepancy between
the geometric distance and their corresponding latencies is
minimized using the Simplex DownHill method [27], a non-
linear optimization algorithm.
Given the K landmarks coordinates, GNP can next compute
the coordinates of any node A based on the measured latencies
between A and each of the landmarks. Host A computes its
own coordinates so that the distance between these coordinates
and the coordinates of each landmark is as close as possible to
its corresponding measured latency. This is again achieved by
means of the Simplex DownHill method. Note that all systems
discussed below are GNP variations.
Lighthouses [28] is a GNP extension seeking to overcome
the limitations generated by the use of landmarks. Indeed,
the measurement traffic arriving at each landmark grows in
proportion to the number of target hosts as the system scales.
To address this, Lighthouses uses multiple landmark sets, with
each ordinary host measuring distances to only one landmark
set. It is built above the concept of multiple local basis with
a transition matrix.
Lighthouses, like GNP, has a special set of landmark nodes








Fig. 6. The hierarchy in NPS
not have to query those global landmarks. Indeed, it first
contacts any node, say B, that is already in the system. Node
B provides to A the list of nodes that can act as A’s landmarks.
In a n-dimensional geometric space, the joining node selects
n + 1 nodes at random among those in this list. It should be
noted that if node A cannot find n+1 landmarks, it constructs
a local basis with the ordinary nodes already in the system.
Every ordinary node has its own basis, also called the local
basis, and computes its coordinates using this basis while in
GNP the same basis was used by all the ordinary nodes in
the system. Therefore, node A constructs a local basis L =
{l1, l2, . . . , ln}, where each vector li is a pair of landmarks,
by applying the Gram-Schmidt process [29]. Simply said, the
Gram-Schmidt process is a method for orthogonalizing a set
of vectors in an inner product space, most commonly the
Euclidean space.
To compare the coordinates of two nodes, the position must
be expressed accordingly to the same basis. The transition
matrix permits to express the coordinates of a node A in the
local basis of another node B. As a result, node A computes a
transition matrix between its local basis and the global basis.
It is worth to notice that this process does not require any
additional distance measurements.
Fig. 5 illustrates Lighthouses behavior in a two dimensional
environment. Let us consider six nodes already present in the
system (n1 to n6 - Fig. 5(a)) and a seventh node, n7 wants to
join the system. The first step for n7 is to contact a node in
the system, for instance n4. n4 replies with a list of nodes that
can act as landmarks for n7, say {n4, n5, n6}. n7 can then start
measuring its distance between itself and the lighthouses. n7
computes next its local basis, using the Gram-Schmidt process
(Fig. 5(b)). Finally, Fig. 5(c) shows the computation of n7
transition matrix.
The PCoord scheme [30] proposes another set of landmark
selection algorithms. It is similar to lighthouse in that they both
do not require each node to measure distances to all the pre-
determined landmarks. Its best landmark selection algorithm
uses gossip protocol [31], [32], [33] to get informed about
other nodes so that it can select a well-spread set of landmarks.
Landmarks, in PCoord, are only used for bootsrapping while
coordinates are calculted in the fahsion of Lighthouses.
The Network Positioning System (NPS) [25] extends GNP
into a hierarchical coordinate system, where all nodes could
serve as landmarks for other nodes. It aims to recover “grace-
fully” from either landmark failures, or situations where these
special entities of the system and their network access links
become performance bottlenecks. The main departure from
GNP is that any node that has determined its position can
be chosen by a membership server to be a landmark for
other nodes. The role of the membership server is to provide
essentially initial configuration parameters (e.g., identify the
landmarks, the maximum number of layers in the system, the
geometric space used for embedding, etc. ) to ordinary nodes
in the system.
Actually, the membership server randomly chooses eligible
nodes to become landmarks when the permanent landmarks
are too heavily loaded or unavailable. To ensure consistency,
NPS imposes a hierarchical position dependency among the
nodes (see Figure 6).
Given a set of nodes, NPS partitions them into different
layers. A set of 20 landmarks is placed in layer-0 (or L0), the
top layer of the hierarchy (these permanent landmarks are the
fixed infrastructure used to define the bases of the geometric
space model), and an 8-dimension Euclidean space is used for
embedding. Each node in layer Li randomly picks some nodes
in layer Li−1 as its landmarks.
Internet Coordinate System (ICS) [34] shares the similarity
with GNP and Lighthouses in that it also represents location of
ordinary hosts in a Cartesian coordinate system. Nevertheless,
ICS provides a unique mapping from the distance mapping
to the Cartesian coordinate system. Further, any ordinary host
does not have to measure its distance to all the landmarks
(called beacon node in ICS), but rather to a subset of beacon
nodes and obtains a n-dimensional distance vector di where
n is a number of chosen beacon nodes among the m avail-
able. The location of the beacon node is then calculated by
multiplying the distance vector with a transformation matrix.
This transformation is based on principal component analy-
sis (PCA) [35], also called the Karhunen-Lo`eve Transform.
This transformation projects the distance data space into a
new coordinate system. The purpose of PCA is to reduce
the dimensionality of a data set (sample) by finding a new
set of variables, smaller than the original set of variables,
that nonetheless retains most of the sample information. By
information, we mean the variation present in the sample given
by the correlations between the original variables. The new
variables, called principal components, are uncorrelated, and
are ordered by the fraction of the total information each one
retains.
The transformation matrix is obtained by applying singular
value decomposition (SVD) on the distance matrix, say D,
formed by the delay measured between beacon nodes. Indeed,
an administrative node is elected among beacon nodes, aggre-
7gates the distance vector of all the beacon nodes, obtains the
distance matrix D, and applies PCA to obtain the transfor-
mation matrix. The role of the administrative node is also to
determine the dimension of the coordinate system.
In order to enhance ICS, a clustering scheme for beacon
nodes and a partial measurement approach, where only a
limited number of beacon nodes are used by an ordinary
node A, are also proposed. In such a case, the administrative
node groups beacon nodes that are close to each other into
clusters, selects for each cluster a median beacon node, and
then sends a list of median beacon nodes to a node willing
to join the ICS architecture. Nevertheless, with respect to the
clustering approach, the beacon nodes need to be placed and
well distributed a priori. The obtained results show that, when
the median node of each cluster is chosen as beacon node, the
estimation errors are smaller than those where beacon nodes
are randomly selected. This implies that a partial measurement
approach method benefits from choosing most representative
beacon nodes.
Tang et al. [36] also applied PCA method to project distance
measurements into a Cartesian coordinate system with smaller
dimensions. We call this technique virtual landmarks. They
considered the coordinate of a host in the coordinate system
as the distances to virtual landmarks while the coordinate
in the distance data space represents the distances to actual
landmarks (beacon nodes). Indeed, Tang et al. propose the
use of the Lipschitz embedding in order to embed distances
between nodes in a low dimensional space obtained by com-
pressing the full delay matrix using the PCA method. The
Lipschitz embedding is the basis for a number of important
theoretical results on minimum-distortion embedding [37],
[38]. For network latency estimation, it has the advantage of
being simple to formulate and fast to compute.
The basic idea of the Lipschitz embedding is to use network
distances themselves as coordinates. To find the coordinate
vector −→x i, for node i, one sets the j
th component of −→x i to
the measured distance between node i and landmark j, for
j = 1, ..., n.
The Lipschitz embedding can be accurate because two
entities that are close to each other in a metric space typically
have similar distances to many other entities. Thus two nearby
points in the original metric space may have very similar
coordinate vectors, and so may map to nearby points under
the Lipschitz embedding.
This study also explores methods to reduce the numberm of
Landmarks that need to be probed without adversely affecting
the accuracy.
By applying the PCA method to anm×n matrix A in which
row i is the initial n-dimensional coordinate vector ~xi for node
i, we can map each ~xi to a new ~yi in a lower dimensional
space, while approximately preserving distances.
The mapping from ~xi to ~yi obtained via PCA is a linear
one. That is, ~yi = M~xi for some M (where M is an r × n
matrix). Final coordinate of node i (the components of ~yi)
can be seen as distances to virtual landmarks. The distance
to a virtual landmark is defined as a linear combination of
distances to actual landmarks.
Tang et al.’s most important findings is that the network
distances can generally be described as the linear combination
of a small number of orthogonal vectors - typically 7 to 9.
In such a case, Tang et al. suggest that an embedding in an
Euclidean space of 7 to 9 dimensions is likely to be sufficient
for reasonable accuracy.
Internet Distance Estimation Service (IDES) [39], [40]
operates as standard landmark-based approaches: landmarks
measure distances between them and report them to a cen-
tralized server (named information server). Ordinary hosts
measure their distance to and from landmarks. The difference
with other approaches described in this section stands in
the mapping calculation. Mao et al. provide two learning
algorithms allowing a linear dimensionnality reduction applied
to matrixes: Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [41] and
Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) [42].
B. Distributed Approaches
This class of approaches extends the embedding concept, ei-
ther by generalizing the role of landmarks to any node existing
in the system, or by eliminating the landmark infrastructure.
Decentralized Internet coordinate systems can be seen as peer-
to-peer network positioning systems.
Practical Internet Coordinates (PIC) [43], [44] does not
require explicitly designated landmarks. In PIC, the joining
node can pick any node whose coordinates have already been
computed to be a landmark. This is similar to GNP [13]
but GNP uses a fixed set of landmarks for all the nodes
that join the system. On the contrary, a PIC node probes the
network distance to each element of a set of landmarks, L,
having at least n+ 1 members, n being the chosen geometric
dimensional space. It uses an active node discovery protocol
to find a set of nearby nodes to use for computing coordinates.
Different strategies such as random nodes, closest nodes, and
a hybrid of both, are proposed. Then it obtains the coordinates
of each landmark and uses the Simplex DownHill method to
compute its coordinates such that the errors in the |L| predicted
distances between the node and each node in L are minimized.
The intuition behind the different strategies to choose the
nodes that acts as landmarks is to overcome the inherent
Simplex DownHill method limitations (cfr. Sec. V-A). The
closest strategy (resp. random strategy) should provide the
Simplex DownHill method with better information to position
the joining node correctly in the Euclidean space relative to
nearby nodes (resp. distant nodes) in the network. Therefore,
the closest strategy should achieve lower relative errors when
predicting short distances whereas the random strategy should
achieve lower relative errors when predicting long distances.
The hybrid strategy should achieve something in the middle.
Shavitt and Tankel discover that the accuracy of IDMaps
depends on the positions between hosts and Tracers [14].
Worst, IDMaps is only able to find the closest node in 85%
of the cases [14].
To overcome this, Shavitt and Tankel introduce Big-Bang
Simulation (BBS) [14], a way to model the network nodes as
a set of particles. Each particle is a node image in a geometric
space. Particles are traveling in the space under the effect of
potential force field. The name ‘Big-Bang Simulation” comes
8from the fact that particles are initially placed at the origin of
the space.
The field force is derived from the potential energy error
which is equal to the total embedding error. The field force
reduces the potential energy of particles and particles pull or
repulse each others depending on the distance error between
them [45]. During each calculation phase, the particles are
traveling in trajectories tending to reduce the potential energy
of the whole system. At the end of each phase, the system ap-
proximately achieves an equilibrium point where the potential
energy is minimized [14].
A calculation phase consists of several iterations which
moves the particles in discrete time intervals. The particles
position and velocity at time t+ δt are calculated by applying
Newton’s laws of motion and the new potential energy is
calculated at the end of the iteration. Note that, the particles
positions and velocities calculated in the current iteration are
the input to the next iteration. Increasing the timestep δ pro-
vides greater numerical efficiency. On the contrary, decreasing
the timestep permits to attract particles to a global minimum
potential energy. A good introduction to Newton’s laws of
motion can be found in [45].
If the particles were only under the force field effect, they
would move away too fast and oscillate forever with constant
velocity. To fix this, a friction force is added.2 With this force,
a part of the energy is lost due to friction and, after a while,
the system stabilizes. The friction force depends on the the
particle normal force. The moving particles are assigned a
friction coefficient µk and the static particles are under the
effect of the µs friction coefficient.
The magnitude fij of the field force determines how much
the induced force pulls or repulses the two particles i and j.
A positive value means that the force pulls the two particles
together. On the contrary, for a negative value, the two particles
are repulsed. Shavitt and Tankel showed that this induced force
is given by the derivative of the prediction error.
The previous NCS we have seen use conventional gradient
minimization schemes, i.e., the Simplex DownHill method.
When such a method is used, the minimization can be caught
by a local minimum but a local minimum is not necessarily
the global one. Thus, while traditional coordinates systems
running the Simplex DownHill method are very sensitive
to the initial coordinates, BBS does not care about initial
coordinates. This BBS quality is the result of the kinetic
energy accumulated by the moving particles, permitting them
to escape a local minimum.
Vivaldi [46] is probably the most successful NCS that has
been proposed so far. It does not require any fixed network
infrastructure and makes no distinctions between nodes. A
Vivaldi node collects distance information for a set of neigh-
bors and computes its new coordinates with the collected
measurements. The idea is that node A is represented as a
unitary mass connected to each neighbor B by a spring with
the rest length set to the measured RTT (i.e., dAB). The actual
length of the spring is the distance predicted in the coordinates
2Friction is the force resisting the relative motion of two surfaces in contact
or a surface in contact with a fluid (e.g., air on an aircraft).
space (i.e., dˆAB). A spring always tries to have an actual
length equals to its rest length. Thus if dˆAB is smaller than
the measured RTT, the spring pushes the two masses attached
to it. On the contrary, if the spring is too long, it pulls the
masses and reduces its actual length.
The Vivaldi procedure uses each RTT sample to update
its coordinates. An identical Vivaldi procedure runs on every
node. Each sample provides information allowing a node
to update its coordinate. The algorithm handles high error
nodes by computing weights for each received sample. The
sample used by each node A is based on measurement to a
node, B, its coordinates xB and the estimated error eB being
reported by B. A relative error of this sample is then computed
with respect to dAB and dˆAB . The node then computes the
sample weight, balancing so local and remote error. The local
(resp. remote) error represents node A confidence in its own
coordinate (resp. node B). This sample weight is used to
update an adaptive timestep, δ, defining the fraction of the
way the node is allowed to move toward the perfect position
for the current sample. Thus, the coordinates are updated by
moving a small step towards the position that best reflects
the RTT measured. The size of the modification depends on
the weight of the sample, and on the difference between the
measured (dAB) and the predicted RTTs (dˆAB). The Vivaldi
algorithm quickly converges towards a solution when latencies
satisfy the triangle inequality.
Vivaldi also proposes a variant of Euclidean Coordinates to
better model Internet latencies, and introduces the notion of
height [46]. A height space consists in an Euclidean coordinate
augmented with a height vector. This vector models the latency
penalty of network access links, such as queuing delay, DSL
lines, or cable modems. With height, the distance between
nodes is measured as their Euclidean distance plus the height
represented by a positive value of the height vector.
It is worth to notice that extensions to Vivaldi have been
provided in order to position nodes in an hyperbolic space [47],
[48].
V. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In Sec. IV, we discussed several NCS techniques. However
most of these systems, if not all, suffer from different limita-
tions. In this section, we discuss such limitations (Sec. V-A and
V-B). Note that Sec. VI will focus on a particular limitation:
security.
It has been shown in previous sections that an NCS allows
for an easy and practical latency prediction on the Internet.
However, one could criticize them for requiring expensive
maintenance and having more or less accurate prediction.
At the very least, triangle inequality violations (TIV) could
be a major barrier for the accuracy of such systems [49],
[50]. Note that the matrix factorization introduced by Mao
et al. in IDES [39], [40] allows a representation of distances
violating TIVs and asymmetric distances. Further, Lee et al.
show that better accuracy can be reached when considering
lower dimensional system (i.e., a 2-dimensional Euclidean
coordinate system) [50], [51].
Lua et al. observe that absolute relative error may not
be the major indicator of the quality of an embedding as
9experienced by a user [26]. They demonstrate that, using other
accuracy metrics that attempt to quantify various aspects of
user-oriented quality (such as Relative Rank Loss or Closest
Neighbors Loss), the quality of the coordinates-based systems
is not as high as suggested by the absolute relative error.
Moreover, choosing the suitable geometric space for coor-
dinates embedding, and more generally, to model the Internet
has received much attention from the research community and
has been shown to be a challenging task. Basically, coordinates
systems have concentrated on pure Euclidean spaces or other
simple geometric spaces like the surfaces of spheres and tori.
Shavitt and Tankel introduce a new coordinates space that
places nodes some distance “above” a Euclidean space (height
model) [52]. Shavitt and Tankel propose using a hyperbolic
coordinates space to model the Internet. The hyperbolic model
may address a shortcoming of the Vivaldi’s height model that
implicitly assumes that each node is behind its own access
link. If two nodes are behind the same high-latency access
link, the height model will incorrectly predict a large latency
between the two nodes: the distance down to the plane and
back up.
In addition to those “common” limitations, a few dis-
advantages which are specific either using landmark-based
approaches, or distributed approaches may exist.
A. Landmark-Based Approaches
Obviously, the main drawback of the landmark-based ap-
proaches is the need of a dedicated landmarks deployment.
In fact, the landmarks number and placement affect the RTT
predictions accuracy. Furthermore, landmarks failures and
overloading also affect latencies which can be measured with
high inaccuracies. Landmark systems do not take advantage of
all exchange between nodes (as in Vivaldi [46] for instance):
only measurements to landmarks are helpful in updating
coordinates. Also, the measurement traffic to the landmarks
increases in proportion to the number of nodes participating
in the system as well the inter-landmark measurements, mod-
erating so the overall system scalability.
To calculate coordinates, GNP, Lighthouses, and NPS for-
mulate a multidimensional global optimization problem that
minimizes the difference between the measured network dis-
tance and the Euclidean distance in a Cartesian coordinates
system. The Simplex DownHill method is then applied to solve
the minimization problem. However, such method only gives
a local minimum that is close to the starting value and does
not guarantee that the resulting coordinates are unique. This
leads to the eventual assignment of different coordinates for
the same node depending on the minimization process.
Finally, the problem of using this method is its slow
convergence. As for virtual landmarks, it uses the Lipschitz
embedding assuming that network distances obey the triangle
inequality. It has been demonstrated that Internet traffic does
not always follow the shortest possible path [26], [49] and
that there is potential violation of the triangle inequality due
to routing policies.
B. Distributed Approaches
This class of approaches extends the embedding concept,
either by generalizing the role of landmarks to any node
existing in the system, or by eliminating the landmark in-
frastructure. Although, distributed approaches have attractive
properties, in particular those of scalability and the “no need”
of dedicated infrastructure, one could criticize them for being
more vulnerable to security threats, as we will discuss it
in Sec. VI, and for having worse prediction accuracy than
landmark-based approaches.
Considering PIC as the first system that aimed at introducing
a security mechanism against malicious behaviors, we notice
that this security mechanism, based on the fact that the triangle
inequality systematically holds, might degrade the system
performance and accuracy. We will discuss this aspect further
in Sec. VI-A. In addition, PIC also uses the Simplex DownHill
method whose main drawbacks were already enumerated in
Sec. V-A.
As Vivaldi simulates a physical spring system, obviously if
the triangle inequality is violated, Vivaldi cannot find perfect
positions for the nodes and is stuck in endless oscillations.
The nodes never converge towards stable coordinates. This
is explained by the fact that Vivaldi uses a moving average
of recent relative errors. It has been demonstrated that, in
presence of TIVs in the delay space, this local error estimate
can oscillate and prevent the system from finding a good
solution [53], [54], [55], [56].
Nevertheless, current live implementations and deployments
of Internet coordinates systems in the “wild” show that using
such distributed NCS is beneficial for P2P applications and
overlays ( [15], [57], [58]) relying on the notion of network
topology-awareness. Using the Azureus BitTorrent network as
a testbed, Ledlie et al. show that even if, live, large-scale NCS
behave differently than the experimentally tested coordinates
system on PlanetLab, Azureus’ coordinates achieve the major
goal they were designed for: deliver a reasonable accurate
positions of nodes, allowing for an acceptable approximation
of nodes proximity, and by inference optimization of overlay
routing [56] 3. Ledlie et al. show that incorporating Vivaldi’s
coordinates in a one million node Azureus network improves
the Azureus efficiency. However, this is achievable by imple-
menting specific techniques in Azureus in order to support
coordinates in an effective way. Basically, to improve the
accuracy and stability of coordinates-based systems, several
works propose different techniques:
• latency filters and application-specific coordinates up-
dates, in order to make the distinction between con-
stantly evolving “system-level” coordinates and “useful
application-level” coordinates that should be stable [56].
It should also be noticed that SVivaldi, proposed by
De Launois et al. [53], proposes a different method
for stabilizing coordinates by asymptotically dampening
the effect of each new Vivaldi measurement. SVivaldi
allows also coordinates to be more accurate. While this
factor does mitigate oscillations in a fixed network, it
3Azureus [15] is currently one of the most popular clients for BitTorrent,
a file sharing protocol [7]
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Landmarks TIVs Sensitivity Forgeable
1. GNP • • •
2. Lighthouses ◦ • •
3. NPS • • ◦
4. ICS ◦ • •
5. Virtual Landmarks ◦ • •
6. PCoord ◦ • •
7. IDES • ◦ •
6. PIC • ◦
7. Vivaldi • •
8. BBS • •
TABLE I
LIMITATIONS OF NCS TECHNIQUES.
prevents the algorithm from adapting to changing network
conditions.
• gossip-based coordinates update, rather than piggybacked
coordinates on to application-level messages. This tech-
nique has been shown to expand the size of the Vivaldi
working set, expanding the set of neighbors for each
node, and then improving its accuracy [56].
• TIVs exclusion or awareness: Inspired by the removal of
a small percentage of the nodes with the largest triangle
inequality violations from the Azureus latency matrix.
Removing 0.5% of nodes leads to 20% improvement
in global accuracy [56]. These observations confirm a
theoretical work that shows how to decrease embedding
distortion by sacrificing a small fraction of distances
to be arbitrarily distorted [59]. These results mainly
demonstrate that if a mechanism could prevent a small
percentage of nodes (Triangle inequality violators) from
affecting the rest of the system, it would improve overall
accuracy. Kaafar et al. also show that an hierarchical
Vivaldi system where TIVs are less severe, will be more
accurate in predicting intra-cluster distances [55]. In addi-
tion, Chen et al. propose Pharos [60], [61], a hierarchical
approach based on the clustering of nodes, to mitigate the
impact of TIVs on distance predictions. Each node uses
two set of coordinates in Pharos. Therefore, coordinates
computed at the lower (resp. higher) level of clusters are
called local coordinates (resp. global coordinates). Within
their cluster, nodes use more accurate local coordinates
to predict intra-cluster distances, and keep using global
coordinates when predicting longer distances towards
nodes belonging to foreign clusters.
C. Summary
Table I summarizes limitations of individual NCS tech-
niques described in Sec. IV. We focus on three key aspects:
landmarks, sensitivity to TIVs and forgeable. To clarify some
of our terminology (Table I): the first column, labeled land-
marks indicates NCS methods (rows 1-5) that are landmark-
based approaches and how these methods are limited by the
use of landmarks. The second column, named TIVs Sensitivity
illustrates the detrimental effect of TIVs on NCS. Finally,
the last column, Forgeable, denotes coordinates or measure-
ments that may be deliberately invalid. “◦” denotes a partial
limitation, e.g., for Lighthouses any node that is already in
the system can act as landmark. Therefore, the drawbacks
generated by the use of landmarks are reduced. “•” indicates
an important limitation, e.g., for Vivaldi in the presence of
TIVs, nodes stick in endless oscillations leading to inaccurate
coordinates.
Lighthouses, ICS, and Virtual landmarks which are based
on a linear matrix transformation are less subject to the
damage caused by a landmark-based coordinates system. In
contrast, the choice of landmarks significantly affects the
accuracy of GNP’s RTT predictions. Despite NPS includes
a hierarchical system for reducing load on the landmark
nodes, it is nevertheless dependent on the landmarks positions.
Fortunately, distributed approaches such as PIC, Vivaldi and
BBS overcome those limitations by eliminating the landmark
infrastructure.
Most of NCS techniques assume that triangle inequality
holds in Internet. Bullets in the second column exhibit some
of the problems for which network coordinates are frequently
criticized, i.e., inaccuracy and fragility in the presence of TIVs.
In fact, network delays do not necessarily satisfy the triangle
inequality due to routing policies. The different coordinates-
based embedding techniques reviewed in this paper suffer from
TIVs. Therefore, when faced with these TIVs, coordinates
systems resolve them by forcing edges to shrink or to stretch
in the embedding space; this intuitively results in oscillations
of the embedded coordinates, and thus leads to large distance
prediction errors.
Unfortunately, NCS are vulnerable to even a small number
of malicious nodes lying about their coordinates or mea-
surements. Some of them, NPS and PIC include a strategy
for mitigating the effects of simple malicious attacks. For
instance hollow bullets in column C (Table I) show that
PIC and NPS are less vulnerable to a potential malicious
nodes compared to other NCS techniques. Indeed, malicious
nodes could potentially lie about their positions and/or inflate
network distances by holding onto probe packets. The basic
idea in NPS is to eliminate a reference point if it fits poorly in
the Euclidean space compared to the other reference points.
Nevertheless, the NPS security mechanism can be defeated
very simply. Basically, the attacker can delay the measurement
probe so that the measured distance will appear to be much
greater than the actual distance. At the same time, the attacker
lies about its coordinates in a way that the resulting estimated
distance is roughly within the measured distance. In addition,
the PIC detection mechanism, based on the observation that
the triangle inequality holds, is affected by potential inequality
violations which often occur in the Internet.
Although network coordinates have attractive properties
for latency prediction on the Internet, they have a potential
limitation in practice because Internet routing policies cause
too many triangle inequality violations. To avoid the pitfall
caused by TIVs, it is mandatory to build systems that are
TIV-aware.
In conclusion, while developing coordinates-based systems
with perfect accuracy is a long-term challenge, current ap-
proaches are already sufficiently accurate for most applica-
tions and allow trade-offs between accuracy and measurement
overhead for dynamic topology-aware overlays.
11
But it should also be noticed that these come at the
expense of slow convergence times ranging from tens of
seconds to several minutes [56]. This is several orders of
magnitude slower than what is achievable with direct ’on-
demand’ distance measurements between nodes and is often
unacceptable for topology-aware applications whose aim is to
quickly identify “best nodes”.
We therefore contend that coordinates-based positioning
systems are an attractive proposition if they are deployed as a
service: every node could run a coordinates system daemon at
boot time which would then be capable of providing accurate
coordinates estimates to applications and their overlays on
request. In essence, the coordinates system could then be seen
as a component of a “virtual infrastructure” that supports a
wide range of overlays and applications.
But a system providing an “always-on and large scale coor-
dinates service” would also likely be a prime target for attacks,
as already introduced above. This disruption could result in
the mis-functioning or the collapse of very many applications
and overlays. Indeed, as the use of overlays and applications
relying on coordinates increases, one could imagine the release
of worms and other malware whose purpose is to attack the
virtual infrastructure as a whole.
Put simply, regardless of the accuracy of these Internet
coordinates systems, securing them is a necessary condition to
their deployment. Security in NCS is one of the most relevant
limitations that these systems are facing today, especially if
we know that most, if not all, of current proposals for coordi-
nates systems assume that the nodes partaking in the system
cooperate fully and honestly with each other, that is that the
information reported by probed nodes is correct. This makes
them vulnerable to malicious attacks. In particular, insider
attacks executed by (potentially colluding) legitimate users or
nodes infiltrating the system could prove very effective, as
shown by Kaafar et al. [62]. In the next section, we discuss
different security issues that NCS are facing, detailing the
different types of attacks that can be harmful for them. We also
present the proposed approaches that deal with these security
issues in an attempt to secure the NCS.
VI. SECURITY
Different approaches have been proposed to secure NCS.
First, two of the systems described in this paper propose their
own specific mechanisms to defend against malicious nodes,
namely PIC [43], [44] and NPS [25]. Recently, it has been
shown that these mechanisms are rather primitive, still in
their infancy, and definitely cannot defend against all types
of attacks. So, in a second step, more generic and robust
approaches have been proposed. In the following, we discuss
the PIC and NPS security mechanisms (Sec. VI-A and VI-
B), and present attacks that have been identified and shown to
drastically degrade the NCS performance (Sec. VI-C). Finally,
we present an overview of the generic defense mechanisms

























Fig. 7. Triangle inequality with measured and predicted distances in PIC
A. PIC Security
PIC aims at defending the security of its coordinates system
against independent malicious participants using a test based
on the triangle inequality. Basically, the test relies on the
observation that the triangle inequality holds for most triples
of nodes in the Internet. Therefore, PIC assumes that for most
triples of nodes a, b and c , d(a, b) + d(b, c) ≥ d(a, c), where
d(i, j) denotes either the measured network distance between
nodes i and j or the virtual distance in the geometric space.
The intuition behind the security test of PIC is as follows.
An attacker that lies about its coordinates or its distance to the
joining node is likely to violate triangle inequality. The joining
node uses the distances it measured to each landmark node and
the coordinates of the landmarks to check for TIVs. It then
removes from its proper set of landmarks used for positioning
the nodes that most violate the triangle inequality.
This is illustrated in Fig. 7 where n denotes a new node
joining the PIC infrastructure. Landmarks i and j are both
used by n to calculate its coordinates.
For each landmark used for coordinates computation, the
security test checks whether the upper bounds and lower
bounds defined by each landmark j are satisfied by i and
computes the upperi and loweri metrics.
upperi is the sum of the deviations above the upper bounds
while loweri is the sum of the deviations below the lower
bounds. The security test computes the maximum value of
both metrics for all landmarks used by n and removes the
landmark which measurements are deviating from the com-
puted upper and lower bounds. Then, the joining node uses the
Simplex DownHill method to compute its coordinates with the
remaining landmarks. This process is repeated a fixed number
of times.
Costa et al. show that such security test can deal with
up to 20% of malicious nodes existing in the system [43],
[44]. However, subsequent works indicate that network RTTs
commonly and persistently violate the triangle inequality [26],
[49]. A security mechanism based on the fact that the triangle
inequality systematically holds, may degrade the performance
of a clean system, i.e., a system without malicious nodes
inside.
B. NPS Security
NPS includes a strategy for mitigating the effects of simple
malicious attacks. Indeed, malicious nodes could potentially
lie about their positions and/or inflate network distances by
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holding onto probe packets. The basic idea is to eliminate a
landmark (by not considering it as so) if it fits poorly in the
Euclidean space compared to the other landmarks. Each node,
when computing its coordinates, based on measurements from
different landmarks, would reject the reference that provides
a relative error significantly larger than the median error of
all other reference nodes. Specifically, assume there are N
landmarks Li, at positions PLi, and the network distances
from a node H to these are DLi. After H has calculated
a position PH based on these reference points, for each Li,




Then the requesting node, H , decides whether to eliminate








ELi > C ×mediani(ELi), (6)
where C is a sensitivity constant. Then, the landmark with
maxiELi is filtered (i.e. H tries to replace it by another
landmark for future repositioning).
Unfortunately, it has been shown that such a security
mechanism is vulnerable to various attacks [62]. Basically,
it consists, from an attacker point of view, in interfering
with the constraints 5 and 6 by lying about its coordinates
and/or tampering with measurement probes. This leads to a
discrepancy between measured and estimated latencies.
In the following, we will present the different classes of
identified attacks on NCS, and describe examples of attacks
belonging to such classes.
C. Internal Attacks
Noticing that current NCS proposals assume fully cooper-
ation and honesty among nodes, for their coordinates embed-
ding, Kaafar et al. show that NCS are vulnerable to malicious
attacks [62], [63]. In particular internal attacks executed by
(potentially colluding) nodes infiltrating the system could
prove being very effective. An internal attack refers to a class
of attacks in which malicious nodes have access to the same
data as legitimate users, often called Insiders. This means
that participants are not completely trusted entities, or that
malicious nodes have the ability to bypass any authentication
mechanism. In essence, malicious nodes are able to send
misleading information when probed, or send manipulated
information after receiving a request or affect some metrics
observed by chosen targets. Based on these assumptions,
Kaafar et al. were the first to identify threats on NCS and
classify attacks into four families [62]:
• Isolation aims at isolating nodes in the virtual coordinates
space.
• Repulsion tries to alleviate a malicious node’s or victim’s
attractiveness.
• Disorder aims at introducing chaos in the coordinates as
a form of denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
• System control tries to take the control of a node that
influences the coordinates of many other nodes or to
become such a node.
We can easily illustrate those classes of attacks through
four concrete examples that can be executed on the Vivaldi
system: Random attack, Independent Isolate attack,
Repulse attack, and Colluding Isolate attack.
A Random attack, is an example of the Disorder class
attacks on the Vivaldi system, where each time a malicious
node is contacted and requested to provide its coordinates,
it replies with randomly generated coordinates and a low
constant value of its local error.
An Independent Isolate attack, is an example of
the Isolation class attacks on the Vivaldi system, where the
malicious node delays the measured RTT such that it is
consistent with the random coordinates it claimed for the
victim it chose at the beginning. The malicious nodes aims at
moving the victim to force its coordinates to be far away from
all other nodes in the system. In other words, the malicious
node will consistently and systematically direct the victim
towards a designated coordinates aiming at isolating it.
A Repulse attack is an example of the Repulsion class
attacks on the Vivaldi system. A malicious node claims a
position that is far away from the actual coordinates, possibly
far away from the origin, and then delays each measurement
it receives in a way consistent with such far away position. In
this way, the malicious node fools other honest nodes that it
is really away from all other nodes in the system.
Finally, a Colluding Isolate attack, is an example
of the system control class attacks on the NPS system. In
this example, the malicious nodes cooperate with each other
and behave in a correct and honest way until enough of them
become landmarks at the same layer in the NPS architecture.
Once at least a minimum number of malicious landmarks has
been reached, these attackers identify a common set of victims.
The goal of this attack is to push the victims into a remote
location at the “opposite” of where the attackers pretend to
be, thus isolating the victims from all the other nodes (in the
coordinates space).
For all these attacks, Kaafar et al. have shown that larger
systems are consistently more resilient than smaller ones (e.g.,
a system of 100 nodes is more sensitive to an attack performed
by 10 nodes than a system with 100,000 nodes with 10,000
attackers) [63]. Hence, it seems to be a compelling case
for large-scale coordinates systems to be built as a virtual
infrastructure service component. The paradox is of course
that always-on, large-scale systems supporting many different
applications will always attract more attacks than systems with
a smaller reach, while the large size of the system itself would
act as a particularly good terrain to create especially virulent
propagation of the attack. Kaafar et al. have also shown that
there is an intrinsic trade-off to be made between accuracy and
vulnerability. Indeed, it has been shown that the more accurate
the system for a given system size, the more susceptible it was
to a same proportionate level of attack.
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D. Generic Security Mechanisms
Guided by the understanding of attack mechanisms and of
their consequences on different NCS, some generic security
mechanisms for coordinates-based systems have been pro-
posed.
Kaafar et al. propose the use of a Surveyor Infrastruc-
ture to track normal behavior of nodes positioning using a
Kalman filter [64], and then share such knowledge with normal
nodes [65]. Surveyor nodes (or Surveyors in short) form a
group of trusted (honest) nodes, scattered across the network,
which use each other exclusively to position themselves in the
coordinate space. Typically, during their embedding process,
nodes use the Kalman filter parameters of a nearby Surveyor
as a representation of normal, clean system behavior to detect
and filter out abnormal or malicious activity.
Saucez et al. introduce a formal reputation model to de-
tect misbehaving nodes [66]. The key idea is to associate
a reputation to each node. This reputation informs on the
reliability of a node: a high reputation refers to an honest
node while a low reputation suggests a non-reliable node. The
reputation of a node is based on how the node behaved in
the past and how old it is in the system. To evaluate the
reputation, two new entities are added in the system: the
Reputation Computation Agent (RCA), a certificating agent,
and the Surveyors, already introduced by Kaafar et al., that
evaluate the nodes trust. Saucez et al. apply this model to
Vivaldi, leading to an extension named RVivaldi. This solution,
however, has the drawback of introducing a single point of
failure, the RCA.
Wang et al. propose to secure network coordinates in
two phases [67]. Firstly, it tries to protect the computation
of coordinates by a customized Byzantine fault detection
algorithm. The second phase is based on a TIV phenomena
heuristic, and tries to secure the measurements from being
delayed by malicious nodes. The said heuristic relies on
the observation that authors have made, and that consists
in noticing that delaying measurements is likely to make
triangle inequality violations. Given the fact that edges that
cause severe violations of triangle inequality are often under
estimated in a malicious nodes-free coordinates system [54],
Wang et al. propose to detect delay measurements using such
an heuristic.
Sherr et al. propose another fully decentralized service,
called Veracity, for securing coordinates systems [68]. Each
node is associated with a set of verifying nodes and the node’s
coordinates are tested based on its error to the verifying nodes.
If a node’s coordinates have large error in predicting the delays
to most of the verifying nodes, the node is considered as
malicious and its coordinates will not be used by other nodes.
Zage et al. in [69] have explored the performance of network
coordinates systems in adversarial environments. They present
a solution based on outliers detection of coordinates and
then use statistical detection mechanisms to differentiate good
nodes and malicious nodes.
E. Summary
Following notations introduced by Table I in Sec. V-C,
Table II summarizes the various security techniques discussed
Generic TIVs Sensitivity Overhead
PIC Security • • •
NPS Security ◦ • •
Surveyors-Kalman filter • • ◦
RVivaldi ◦ • •
Byzantine fault detection ◦ • •
Veracity ◦ • •
TABLE II
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Fig. 8. Interactions between nodes in a reputation-based embedded system
in this section.
The first column, labeled Generic, determines whether the
solution is generic (i.e., it might be applied to any NCS) or
not. The second column, named TIVs Sensitivity, shows if the
security introduced in the NCS allows to get rid of TIVs.
Finally, the last column (Overhead) discusses the overhead
introduced by the security add-on. “◦” denotes an absence of
limitation while •” indicates the presence of a limitation.
Despite the numerous improvements to NCS covered in this
section, we are forced to observe that TIVs sensitivity remains
a common feature. Further, most of the improvements intro-
duce an overhead when calculating a node’s coordinates. For
instance, the reputation model introduced within Vivaldi (i.e.,
RVivaldi) requires a strong overhead in coordinates calcula-
tions, as illustrated by Fig. VI-E. Indeed, in a reputation-based
approach, the new coordinates also depend on the reputation
of the neighbors. When A updates its coordinates based on
measurements with node B, it first contacts B to retrieve its
coordinates (~xB) and reputation (ρB). A then calculates its
new coordinates as a function of its own coordinates, B’s
coordinates and B’s reputation. Then, A contacts the RCA,
to update its own reputation. The RCA aims at constructing
a reliable reputation for any node in the embedded system.
For this, it requires the Surveyors (S1 and S2 on Fig. VI-
E). Surveyors are well-chosen nodes performing experience
measurements and trust estimation on other nodes. The RCA
also calculates its own trust to A’s surveyors. Finally, the RCA
evaluates the new reputation of A with all these parameters
(i.e., the trust surveyors have in A and the trust the RCA has in
A’s surveyor). Further, as already mentioned, the introduction
of the RCA leads to the single point failure risk, which is not
suitable for an always-on service.
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VII. NEXT STEPS
Up to now, all the NCS discussed in this paper focus on
predicting the network latency. It should be noted however,
that if latency is the primary network metric that has been
embedded in coordinates spaces, there are at least two ap-
proaches to including other network characteristics, such as
bandwidth and jitter.
First, these could be made as additional dimensions in
existing latency space. For instance, Oppenheimer et al. as well
as Lee et al. have investigated the inverse correlation between
latency and bandwidth [70], [71]. The correlation Oppen-
heimer found implies that network-aware decisions made in
the latency space may result in good bandwidth characteristics.
The second approach is to embed additional performance
indicator in their own metric-space, as it has already been
performed with delays, and the existing NCS approaches. This
is certainly a challenging, but useful task. Bandwidth, for
instance, is an important performance metric that has already
emerged as a candidate for network coordinates embedding. A
set of applications, such as online media streaming or movie
downloads require to select servers based on bandwidth in
addition to latency. To the best of our knowledge, Sequoia [72]
is the first NCS proposed to fill this gap. The key idea beyond
Sequoia is that, under certain circumstances, the bandwidth
might be seen as a tree metric. A set of measures is a tree
metric if it can be derived from distances on a tree, that
is, embedded on a tree [72]. For instance, the bandwidth
is a tree metric when it primarily depends on the last-mile
access link. Based on this observation, Ramasubramanian et
al. derives the notion of prediction trees, where end hosts at
the leaf connected via a network of virtual inner nodes with
assigned link weights model latency or bandwidth. Sequoia
maintains a collection of virtual trees between the participants
and provides so latency or bandwidth predictions.
Sequoia mostly differs from various NCS surveyed in this
paper as it does not aim at mapping any participant into a
geometric space.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen the rising of a new class of large-
scale globally distributed network services and applications.
Those systems are characterized by the fact they can choose
the path to use among a set of available ones. This selection
might be done based on the path performance, such as the
latency.
However, performing large-scale measurements is inefficient
and not network friendly as injected probes consume undue
network resources. To make network measurements more scal-
able, a new range of applications, called Network Coordinate
System (NCS), has been developed and extensively studied
those last years.
In this paper, we surveyed the various NCS proposed by the
networking research community. We provide information on
the general behavior of an NCS, that is modeling the Internet
as a geometric space and characterize the position of any
node in the Internet by a position (i.e., coordinates) in this
space. We described NCS that are landmarks-based or fully
distributed. We also discussed their limitations and open issues
that still needed to be addressed in NCS. In particular, we
focus on an important drawback: the security. We reviewed
several potential attacks and explained how NCS might be
improved in order to be more secure.
All NCS described in this paper focused on latency predic-
tions. However, more and more applications require to measure
or at least have an estimation of other network metrics, such as
jitter and bandwidth. In this paper, we also explained the first
solutions developed by the research community for predicting
bandwidth.
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